This is a supplement to the official SMAAC comments regarding the MSP Capital Improvements Program, 2015-2021Read more
The Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) staff said last January that the NTSB warning about aborted landings (1 Jul 2012) "did not apply to MSP."Read more
Is MSP way too busy at times?
The South Metro Airport Action Council (SMAAC) has been asking this question since September 2010. That month two jets almost collided in mid-air just after taking off on MSP’s parallel runways at about the same time. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was culpable.Read more
SMAAC First Comment on the MSP 2015-2021 Captial Improvements Plan and
Annual Assessment of Environmental Impacts
The South Metro Airport Action Council (SMAAC) has opened a "Citizens’ log" on for residents encountering unusual annoyances from overflights.
Use Remarks for your reports.
SMAAC, the citizen-based group monitoring issues at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) wants your reports as a check on flight activities compared to schedules and FAA transitions from VFR to automated procedures.
The Planning, Development and Environment (PDE) Committee of the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) will consider an MSP site and capacity re-evaluation, or Part 161 Plan, at its July 7, 2014 meeting.
Andy Pasztor and Jon Kamp of the Wall Strett Journal reported this week that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is "... paying more attention to potential hazards ... near busy runways in the event aircraft lose an engine during takeoff.Read more
"The FAA Safety (first?) and Efficiency (operations at minimum separations whenever possible) policy urgently needs revision." That is what the South Metro Airport Action Council told Minnesota's US Senators and Representatives today (2 Apr 2014) by Email.
The recent Asiana Airlines and NTSB public statements about the fatal July 2013 crash at San Francisco's International Airport confirmed serious problems with training for and use of flight automation systems, which can be in various states, neither "all functions on" nor "all functions off." See http://www.quiettheskies.org/smaacforum/index.php?topic=390.0
Stretching the FAA responsibility to foreign airlines operating in the U.S. is dicey, as is the FAA's tracking of systems anomalies and deficiencies. The FAA (and other Federal agencies such as DOD and NASA) are also responsible for tracing the cause of avionics systems failures to the aircraft and avionics manufacturers.
The public is kept unaware of the above difficulties. Most information as released is unnecessarily technical, full of industry jargon and acronyms, and only available months or years after a crash.
The Congress is more aware, but safety concerns rarely lead to budget increases or the acceleration of R&D or deployment by FAA or airlines, As both the designer of air traffic control and airport instrumentation and the regulator of how these systems are complemented in aircraft and used in practice, the FAA is severely challenged. Almost daily, specific risky incidents are reported, sorted for investigation, and no details are reported until long after the incident. The investigations are costly and only events involving fatalities are expected to be thoroughly investigated. -- many of these investigations remain inconclusive forever.