We are pleading for bold political leadership on commercial aviation needs. It is painful to contemplate what our children and grandchildren may face if we fail to step up now.
In the coming months, SMAAC will engage the campaign challenges posed by how social distancing or accepting risks: Is there a virtual stump-speech, rally, fund-raiser, debate or door-knock?
Are TV ads, blogs or social media trees credible?
The Board wants to open this blog (NEWS) for in-bound campaign news and messaging from candidates to Members. We'll need moderators and fact-checkers!
The Board wants to ask candidates what they know about airlines, airports, air traffic control, air pollution and public health and safety. And what they'd work to fix if elected. We'll need writers, analysts and contacts with campaigns and candidates.
WHO WILL STEP UP?
The Special Metro Airports Analysis Center is starting to track how the $billions appropriated to “tide-over” commercial aviation is being used. A Minneapolis-St. Paul Business Journal report steered us to Seth Kaplan, a well-known journalist and airline-industry expert, already known at the Center for his remark: “It’s not that an airline, after it merges… has to pick a hub to close.” The Center is trying to extend investigations of the airline routes, created during “recovery” after both 9/11 and after the recession of 2008, as increasing greenhouse gas volumes emitted (global warming, air pollution), and the cost of air travel.
Will a recovery from the economic hardships imposed to control the COVID-19 pandemic
be fair (democratic and equitable)?
We fear it will not, given the history
and the importance of international (air) travel to both
controlling human epidemics and lubricating global economic growth.
In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned airports that many epidemiological studies correlated overflights and increased health and mortality risks within ten miles of busy airfields. Increased incidences of pulmonary and cardiovascular diseases were found,
Correlating changes at urban airports, higher pollution doses from jet operations to health risks had seemed easy enough in 2014. WHO reported that the correlation was stronger applied to persons who had lived near or worked at a busy airport. Hearings were held in the House of Representatives and bills were passed and funds appropriated to study the topic. EPA/FAA Finding was issued in 2015, connecting commercial aviation to excessive releases of greenhouse gases. By law, the Agencies prepared to promulgate Rules.
We asked for health-outcomes studies, unsuccessfully, at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, as part of the 2010-2025 Metropolitan Transportation Policy Plan. University of Southern California scientists compared the density of sub-micron particulates in lower-income neighborhoods east of Los Angeles International Airport and found an abundance of particles ear-marked chemically as produced in jet engines. That study was repeated in Seattle just last year.
The responsibility for overflight pollution rules (EAW/EIS work) was muddled by de-regulation lobbies. There were a multitude of deaf ears in city halls, airport sponsor’s hearing rooms, and State capitols. The EPA/FAA Finding was nullified in 2017 by the Trump Administration.
Last year we updated and released a White Paper and, with citizen groups in other aviation-impacted cities, hoped to extend National Airspace System (NAS) analyses with more concern for health and environment impacts.
In the COVID-19 crisis, the large airlines, some airliner manufactures and other aviation interests reacted in the same ways they had reacted to climate change in 2017, to financial audits in 2009 and to security in 2002: air operations are not solely to blame and must not be regulated. Yet we know COVID-19 was harsher for persons with lung and heart disease.
The FAA reacted slowly after 9/11 and the Next Gen developments, funded in 2007, got in the way. FAA, airports, and airlines acted badly after the 2008 financial crisis. The Congress, too: bills were introduced to increase funding of Next Gen and privatize air traffic controller jobs. Bills were passed to enable airline mergers and reduce inspections; airline mergers were allowed that more or less passed $millions from air travelers to airline executives.
Federal statistics (USDOT) show that jet fuel burned by commercial flight operations in 2011 was 20 to 25% greater than in 2005 --when millions more travelers flew. The difference was noted at hub airport as routes were changed for safety reasons. Four findings were documented:
- U.S. passengers-boarded in 2010 were less, but 2010 fuel consumption was greater (each compared to 2005). The average trip was apparently quite a bit longer, because the average aircraft in 2010 had fewer seats and a lot more cargo weight was carried in passenger flights in 2005.
- In 2011, a majority of passengers boarded at fewer airports than in 2005; shown by sorting airports by departing passengers, highest to lowest, and a running total.
- There were significant differences in airport rank, sorted by runway operations per day.
- At the busiest airports, flight operations per day were higher, and more concentrated at peak hours, in 2011 than in 2005.
We conclude that city-hub-city passengers traveled fewer miles each in 2005.
There were fewer seats available per departure in 2011, and
airlines prospered by higher load-factors and much higher average fares.
Health and safety risks increased as a result at MSP and similar hub airports.
We thought this had to be addressed by Federal policy. The DOT and FAA operational statistics had become less available and epidemiological research more prevalent.
In 2014, the MAC and the Met C were to update the Metropolitan Transportation Policy Plan for 2015 to 2035. The MSP CIP plan for 2010 to 2017 was to be approved. Facilities needed were postponed: said to be because the peak runway use rates were reduced (CRO safety) and amendments to the Consent Decree on Noise Mitigation.
SMAAC and similar groups around the country connected with EPA and FAA in 2013 (soon after President Obama recommended attention to the relationship of high-rate airport flight operations to air pollution, the 2010 WHO Warning. The result was the Official Finding in 2015 that, by law, resulted in drafting Rules for approach and departure routes and rates in GFY 2016 that did not happen.
In 2002 and 2008, the airline business had dropped like a stone,
but recovered financially after bailouts, with higher profits,
fewer airlines, less service, less safety, and less oversight.
Also, more pollution including GHG and particulates (carbon footprints).
Opinion by Jim Spensley, Co-Founder, Special Metro Airports Analysis Center
© Copyright 2020
SMAAC, Minneapolis, MN
Governor Walz has been confronted with decisions about various projects --pipelines, for example --as to ongoing risks of harm to the larger environment from leaks or spills that pollute streams or aquifers. He considered that climate change and global warming caused by GHG gas emissions was similar and issued Executive Order 19-37 directing State departments and agencies to reduce GHG emissions.
We have been asking the Metropolitan Council (MetC) and the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) for decades to include environmental impacts from overflights as a topic in planning for more air traffic at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP). The MAC has unusual authorities under Minnesota law and rules for assessing the environmental impacts of MSP on-site projects, facilities, and operations:
1] the Commission may skip EAWs for smaller projects and, orginally assess cumulative impacts over time each year in the Assessment Of Environmental Effects or AOEE. The AOEE was originally a Hearing Examination to find the pertinent facts, such as the increased fuel used per boarded passenger using two regional jets rather than one B-727 to fly from Chicago Midway to MSP. Hint: 2 landings and two take-offs rather than one.
2] the Commision prepares Environmental Assessment Worksheets (EAWs) for larger projects and decides itself whether an Environmental Impacts Statement (EIS) is needed.
Jet exhaust contains substances that pollute the air, including GHG emissions. GHG and solids from jet aircraft operations are proportional to fuel used, hours of operation and proximity, creating local health risk in addition to their global warming impact. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Aviation Agency officially found that commercial avaition added significant GHG volumes to the atmosphere, proportional to fuel consumption. Both fewer miles flown and less fuel used (less GHG released per hour) are possible improvements.
Note: Fuel efficiency --consumption in "miles per gallon" --for commecial flights is a very misleading parameter.
1. At cruise altitudes less fuel is burned per hour than at low alitudes: slightly less GHG is emitted traveling 500 miles at 36,000 feet altitude than traveling 120 miles per hour around airports!
2. Circling around an airport awaiting your turn to land is a net zero miles per gallon.
3. Flying from Indianapolis to Los Angeles via Dallas is shorter than flying via Minneapolis but longer than it used to when there was a hub in St. Louis. Still people fly from Indianapolis to LA via Minneapolis because it is cheaper --but uses more fuel and makes more GHG.
What MSP Airport’s LONG-TERM COMPREHENSIVE PLAN Means for Climate Change
SMAAC today released an announcement that it was supporting changes across the U.S. and at MSP Airport to reduce GHG emissions. Here are some excerpts.
"Citizens' groups and cities in several States connect the National Airspace System (NAS) to climate change now that the net increase in miles flown per trip since 2005 has been pointed out. The Special Metro Airports Analysis Center’s White Paper Air Traffic Control at Major Hub Airports and Metroplexes urged Congress to plan a National Airspace System for reasonable and responsible air traffic control, instead of trying to automate currently crowded routes.
"In many ways, Next Gen was a start-over at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP). Serious safety incidents were discounted by the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC); air traffic planning became entangled in the extended sound insulation litigation, and poor choices were made about new routes and environmental assessments near the airport.
"There may be no requirement in Minnesota law to complete a formal environmental study before negotiating “air rights” and capacity with the Federal government. So what? Cost and safety risk management can be agreed upon with GHG per flight an added benefit."
Attention Members: The MSP LTCP Update schedule --late by several years -- parallel the 2020 Election schedule. So, let's take an endorsement/platform stand! You can use the LINK below to access an editable Resolution to modify and share with the campaigns you support and the caucuses and conventions you attend.
The FAA chose to ignore the impact of overflight pollution according to internal USDOT/IG documents originated by FAA. The troubled Next Gen air traffic control program elevated "industry (airline) expectations" over public health and safety.
CAUTION: While we believe that the premise is correct --FAA usually designs PBN/RNAV route procedures only to increase hourly use of runways and other airport facilities --the IG study was of Metroplex implementations, multiple airports in urban areas.
When Next Gen could not resolve air traffic congestion in "more complex" airport and large metropolises without increasing air pollution and safety risks, they doubled down on "efficiency policy." During the last years of the George W. Bush administration, with the Next Gen program under development --and nothing else funded --FAA anticipated an expansion of routes, along the East Coast especially, and an "airline demand" for greater runway availability at many airports. Outside of the R&D departments, air traffic control management planned to "optimize runway use at minimum separations."
This is not news at MSP. FAA tried PBN routes at MSP soon after the September 2010 near-mid-air-collision, and the MAC maintained the illusion that environmental reviews and noise mitigation would be continued. FAA publicity featured "optimized efficient use of airport facilities and airspace," and airlines characterized noise complainers as being against the efficient and optimized flight routes needed for economic growth.
"Politicians (cynically or stupidly?) adopted the above views and did not question the MAC seriously when investigations of public health and safety or environmental impacts (GHG for example) were denied." Jim Spensley, SMAAC President
FAA ADMITS PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN IMPLEMENTING OVERFLIGHT ROUTES NEAR AIRPORTS: "......THE FOCUS WAS UPON OPTIMIZING ROUTES AND AIRSPACE DESIGN" RUNWAY-USE EFFICIENCY WAS "THE ONLY CONSIDERATION."
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE FAA'S METROPLEX AND NEXTGEN IMPLEMENTATIONS OF GPS-PLANNED AND FLOWN ROUTES (PBN/RNAV ROUTES).
In a bombshell and likely accidental admission, the FAA revealed the truth about how the MetroPlex and NextGen flight paths were designed
without noise, ground safety and public impact issues being considered. The FAA was responding in writing to an audit conducted
by the Transportation Departments Inspector General. The audit report stated that community noise issues were problems that were causing
delays with the FAA's implementation of the MetroPlex program across the Country. The FAA's response to the audits findings stated that
after noise issues became problematic, it later changed it's processes to include those concerns in future design procedures. But in doing
so, it admitted that the original design processes (which were used for the Sky Harbor NextGen flight paths) only considered optimization
of paths to benefit the industry. Here is the text of the FAA response regarding noise concerns from page 37 of the audit report:
"In order to address extensive community concerns about new noise exposure, procedures are designed and implemented that do not maximize
efficiency benefits, but do result in less noise exposure. When the Metroplex program began in 2010, the focus was upon optimizing routes
and airspace design. When community concerns were included in the design equation, optimization was no longer the only consideration. It
is an extraordinarily complex balancing act to provide both efficiency benefits to industry and to minimize new noise exposure in
communities. These are usually competing priorities."
The FAA also went on to admit that the programs only intent was to make use of all available airspace which created new noise impacts
over areas that previously had not experienced flight path intrusions:
"The intent of the Metroplex program was to make efficient use of all available airspace, which created new noise impacts. In many
communities, some neighborhoods experience less noise, and some more-relieved communities generally have not recognized the beneficial
noise reductions, while impacted communities strongly oppose the new or increased exposure."
The title of the audit report, issued on August 27th is "FAA Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Metroplex Program, But Benefits for
Airspace Users Have Fallen Short of Expectations". The report goes on to say the the FAA is behind schedule in implementing the programs and
that benefits as promised are questionable. Other statements from the report include:
"Delays have occurred largely due to increased community concerns about aircraft noise."
"Since 2014, further delays have occurred as FAA has implemented new PBN (Performance Based Navigation) procedures at more sites, largely
due to increased community concerns. For example, in fiscal year 2018, FAA cancelled the Phoenix Metroplex project due to litigation related to a previous PBN project."
Thank you for responding and particularly for submitting ideas for actions.
- Over 99% of the respondents had no idea that the MAC had reorganized, appointed a Long-Term Comprehensive Plan (LTCP) Stakeholders Advisory Panel, and embarked on an 18-month process. The “never heard of the panel’ including 3 Council Members in cities that assigned staff to be on the Panel.
- Most respondents wanted SMAAC to hold Forums (addressing GHG emissions in particular) and organize communications programs to engage the public, and through the public, elected officials. We have a few volunteers for forum arrangements, social-media networking, and caucus resolutions.
- Many respondents suggested alliances with Climate Change activists and environmentalists.
The South Metro Airport Action Council (SMAAC) notified the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) that the Council intends to engage the public in monitoring the development of the MSP Long-Term Comprehensive Plan for 2020-2040. The impacted travelers and the overflown populations should be more directly consulted, interviewed, studied and consulted.
SMAAC messaged the MAC’s Planning, Development, and Environment Committee and FAA Great Lakes Regional Air Traffic Control Administrator that the public’s proper participation included questions & answers about environmental, safety and health risk changes in overflights and at MSP. The changes implemented in 2010 precipitated a ten-year delay in presenting the 2015-2025 LTCP for a Metropolitan Council Public Hearing.
The message also noted the appearance of FAA Administrator Rebecca MacPherson, who has made several visits to MSP to explain the next-to-final step in air traffic management, leaving 5-year gap. Safety changes at MSP involving landings on R-35: Runway use rates (or the interval between flight operations) are complicated by the number of runways in use and, in ‘northwest flow’ by the possibility of an aborted R-35 approach risking a collision or low altitude emergency maneuvers by entering airspace occupied by aircraft departing MSP after take-off on the parallel runways.
Paraphrased text of the email:
MAC: Dealing with the public's questions during the planning process could make the Met C Transportation Policy Plan Hearing delay more acceptable. Public health and safety and the environment questions abound about the LTCP; economic impacts need more attention.
The LTCP and 20 years of capital improvements will depend on EITHER the forecast daily operations being planned with balanced safe operations/hour and low safety risks OR being planned with the intent to pursue more runway-use “efficiency” and more flight capacity with whatever Next Gen systems may be deployed here and deal later with safety and too late for environmental remediation..
The two choices mentioned echo the choices considered in the dual-track studies and debated for many hours during and after legislative hearings. Those were, are: limit use and consider public health and safety, environmental impacts, and compatible zoning in the cost of flight operations before adding capacity or not. The difference is now we know the external costs are huge and the airport costs are unpredictable.