Most people appreciate the service of air traffic controllers, but airports and airlines often don't. Congress usually appropriates funds for improved ATC tracking and communication systems over 3 to 5 years, complicating use and safety; changes in biennial reauthorizes make implementations chaotic and expensive.

Meanwhile, DOGE and President Trump have reduced  --and plan to continue  reducing --funding and staff at FAA, NAS, and NTSB. Is the recent batch of aviation crashes the result? Of course it is! Air Traffic management risks include busy-hour complexity, and staffing remote ATC at Intermediate airports overnight involves unscheduled flights, so controllers may be busy when called, unaware of an earlier call or assigned to two flights simultaneously. That was part of the recent collision near Reagen National Airport and of a fatal  crash in Minnesota not long ago. 

U.S. Senators and Representatives tolerate this now and seemingly are not alarmed.  Some are even less informed than their constitutes and their caucus’ Transportation Committee delegates. So, yes, aviation safety is not a political goal.

MORE BACKGROUND

Metro areas are in danger because:

• Air Traffic Controllers are stressed by peak hour communications issues. A biased President will again underfund FAA and NTSB and prefer less than ready White ATC controllers to more educated applicants.
• ATC, NAS, and TRACON controllers are challenged by varied tracking and communication systems at peak hours and for remote ATC overnight. During the first Trump term, air traffic controllers were reduced and system improvements not installed as planned.
• The key industry economic at airports is full loads. Airline fares on long-reserved trips break-even at about 70% full. Revenue is enough for operations, so a connecting fare is around 90% profit for the airline, and revenue for the airport and the FAA. Hub airports crowd peak hours –more gates and storage, busy peak-hour runways and taxiways.
• SMAAC and others pointed out that one of the results of the maximum safe hour reduction at MSP was more routes and more time at lower altitudes before flights were turned over to NAS en route control. That is, most flight routes closer to the reliever airports and spreading more concentrated pollution. Flights to and from MSP Airport are scheduled close together to maximize loads on departing flights. The crowded airport and short intervals are riskier due to more routes and how approaches are stored in the air and departures are stored on the ground.
• The current plan is complicated, TRACON and Air Traffic Control Towers are busy but sufficiently staffed only if runway schedules are kept. The safety problem is due to more concentrated peak-hour flight schedules and different, lower hourly maximums. (Planned annual capacity is rarely discussed because there is no demand for high operations overnight. The 1996 legislation that limited MSP annual use was based on much higher hourly use and a shorter busy day.)

SMAAC testified at the 2010 LTCP Hearing that safe daylight air traffic volumes were undecided because of a pending Safety Order. Only a few days after a near-mid-air collision at MSP Airport, take-offs using the parallel runways were rapidly turned to free airspace. But the 6 new departure routes were closer to reliever airports and used more fuel.

We had been aware of an FAA/NTSB study of a Las Vegas crash and a pending Safety Order, applying to MSP in case of an aborted R35 landing in NW flow. The rule would hold operations on the parallel runways during a R35 approach and landing. The 1996 law limiting MSP airport flights was based on estimated need after 2020 given the estimated State economic need. That assumed the hourly flights could be 60 departures and 60 arrivals.

The NTSB and FAA were about to limit arrivals using R35 and departures on R30 L/R to a total of about 70 operations per hour. Eight departure routes and three arrival routes would need about 12 active Controllers.

Controllers at Reagan Airport were dealing with more than one flight, certainly a possible cause for the helicopter-airliner collision. In Minnesota 2 people were killed in a private aircraft crash after a near miss at St. Cloud. The private plane was cleared for take-off and route from the MSP Tower. It was disabled by being closely overflown by a B-737 Transport in an emergency landing, also directed remotely. Different controllers in the MSP Tower managed the two aircraft. The NTSB investigation noted the overflight but since the separation was unknown and the small plane pilot killed the cause was uncertain.

Many DOD, air taxi services, business and regional flights are mixed into scheduled routes around large hub airports. International and private flight pilots may have different avionics and communication equipment. MSP Airport (for the last 25 years) has been in an Airline-FAA-MAC debate over the maximum safe flights per hour.

Other aspects of the planning were changed by the Legislature for 2020 and MAC plans for operations at its 7 airports involves wide-area air traffic control. MAC no longer considers public health and safety risks from pollution or accidents.  

SMAAC understands why the Metropolitan Airport Commissioners hoped for an affordable solution that met Metropolitan economic needs, but that depended on NAS and the major airlines, particularly Delta. The Minnesota Legislature represents the entire State, and both affordable air transportation and local jobs are related to air service management. The 3-way politics include need more safety and economic debate, but the Legislature rescinded  the Long-Term Comprehensive Plan public hearing examinations and left no elected body assigned.

GLOSSARY

DOGE       Department Of Government Efficiency

FAA           Federal Aviation Administration

NAS           National Aviation System (En route air traffic control and surveillance)

NTSB         National Transportation Safety Board (Investigations)

TRACON   Terminal Radar Approach Control (NAS to Airport Guidance)